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BOOK REVIEWS
the parties and causes for divorce. He thinks that such uniformity, coupled
with a restriction of grounds for divorce, would be better for our law as
well as our social institutions.
Governor Whitman, in a comparison of the administration of the criminal
law in England, France, and America, shows rather pointedly our slow and
defective procedure here, as a probable contributing factor to the crime
wave. Judge Cohalan, in his article, "How Not to Try a Case," gives a
message which every young lawyer, as well as the experienced practitioner,
would do well to read. It is an interesting topic, and carries with it a mes-
sage which it is well to heed, but, nevertheless, the knack of trying a case
seems to be acquired only with experience. Thus, we have a book which
contains the thoughts of many great minds, a book which it is well worth
everyone's while to study, if not for the learning itself, then for the view-
point one gets.
CHARLES H. LUECKING.
St. Louis Bar.
THE LzaAL EFTrCTs or RECOGNITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, AS INTER-
PRETED BY THE COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES, by John G. Hervey.
Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1928. Pp. xiv, 170.
In this small volume Mr. Hervey has made a very practical and useful
contribution to the literature of international law in a field of growing im-
portance to the preservation of peace and justice among nations.
The so-called Family of Nations, arising out of the Peace of Westphalia
as some four or five hundred autocratic political entities, each supreme and
unaccountable, has very naturally exhibited few of the traits of forbearance
and sympathy which are to be found in a normal family. The very nature
of their sovereignty, which the Peace of Westphalia confirmed to them,
precluded the idea of the existence of international duties resting upon them
corresponding to their arrogated unlimited international rights.
In organization the Family of Nations suggests an exclusive club split
into cliques yet held together by an assumed common superiority. They
admit no obligation to recognize any new State or any new government in
an old State, save in their own good pleasure. States and governments
not recognized are in a condition of ostracism, are ignored as though non-
existent. As to them, there is no application of the so-called fundamental
rights of existence, independence, equality, commerce, respect and juris-
diction; and their subjects and citizens are left without international pro-
tection in non-recognized states.
Such was the situation when the United States came into being. But,
under the inspiration of its liberal political philosophy of that day, our
government, through Thomas Jefferson as Secretary of State, immediately
laid down for itself a rule of recognition which did credit to our logic as
well as to our zeal for liberty. It was conveyed to Gouverneur Morris, ouz
Minister to France, in 1792, on the occasion of the deposition of Louis XVI,
in these words:
"It accords with our principles to acknowledge any government to be
rightful which is formed by the will of the nation, substantially
declared."
And in 1798:
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"We surely cannot deny to any nation that right whereon our own
government is founded-that every one may govern itself according to
whatever form it pleases, and change these forms at its own will; and
that it may transact its business with foreign nations through what-
ever organ it thinks proper, whether King, Convention, Assembly, Com-
mittee, President or anything else it may choose."
But this doctrine of "The will of the nation," as determinative of the right
of recognition, was without a chance of adoption by those states of Europe
which were to spend the next half-century ruthlessly suppressing "the
will of the nations" wherever it was declared contrary to the claims of
legitimacy. Nor did the United States adhere for long to this fine logical
test. Rather it adopted the policy generally that it would recognize any
government that held adequate power, however acquired, with such excep-
tions as interest might dictate.
The granting or withholding of recognition to states and governments, is
commonly used as a powerful instrument of policy. The United States
has granted recognition at times in great haste, as in Panama three days
after its revolt and before Colombia could prepare for reconquest; and it
has refused to recognize obvious facts in Central America because they
were unpleasant, until inconvenience to itself forced a change of attitude.
The main concern of Mr. Hervey's work, however, is with the more prac-
tical aspect of the legal effects of recognition and non-recognition, or to
use his own words:
"The object of the present work is to study the effects of recognition
as revealed by the decisions of the courts, and to determine critically
the correctness or incorrectness of the positions assumed by the courts
with a view toward furnishing a guide for future use in the determina-
tion of such cases and controversies."
And to this end Mr. Hervey has gathered together and analyzed more
than two hundred of the leading American and English decisions ranging
over a period of 150 years.
In these days of increasing interdependence of peoples, the importance
of the subject becomes plain when it is realized that, by practice, recog-
nition of a new state or government is necessary to confer a status before
the courts of the recognizant state; that unrecognized governments and
states have no persona standi in judicio, and yet, like alien enemies, may
not be immune from suit in non-recognizant states. When a numerous
people, such as the Russians, finds itself thus outside the protection of
prevailing law, well might the earnest student seek for new guides in the
interest of common sense and common justice.
As Mr. Hervey points out, the courts of the United States and England
have not been entirely insensible to the anachronisms of past practice and
they are gradually feeling their way to juster action.
Recognition of a new state may be granted in several ways, as by the
negotiation of a treaty, impliedly or expressly according it; and by the
sending of. a diplomatic agent. Recognition being a political act, the
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power to extend it usually vests in the political or executive department of
government.
The judicial branch of government uniformly considers itself bound in
such political questions by the action or deliberate inaction of the executive,
not only with respect to new states and new governments but also with
respect to conditions of belligerency and insurgency. Any other course
would necessarily lead to confusion and conflict of policy.
When a new government has ousted a former recognized one, it may or
may not be recognized as the de facto government. If not recognized the
old government is by practice viewed as continuing, even though it has
been annihilated. Such was and is the attitude of the United States to-
ward Russia, though the Kerensky and Czarist governments were swept
away more than a decade ago. In 1918, when the Soviet government had in
fact been in power for a year, the Department of State certified to a New
York Federal court that one Serge Ughet, financial attach6 of the Russian
Ambassy under the Kerensky Government, was the duly accredited repre-
sentative of Russia in this country; and as late as 1927 a judgment for
$984,104.62 obtained by Mr. Ughet, on behalf of the Czarist government,
was paid to him as a good discharge with the approval of the United States
Supreme Court. Though a Soviet representative, unofficially in the United
States, protested and sought to intervene, both he and the Soviet govern-
ment were treated as non-existent.
This suit, growing out of the Black Tom explosion in 1916, was originally
styled Imperial Russian Government v. Lehigh Valley Railway Co. Since
both the Imperial and the successor Kerensky governments had disappeared,
the court granted a motion to entitle the plaintiff "The State of Russia,"
which still lived. This is significant of an attempt to meet the realities,
though by prevailing conceptions a state without a government is in
suspense.
Our courts and those of England have had to deal with many cases
growing out of the confiscation decrees of the Soviet government, where
the property came within their jurisdictions. In one recent case of
Wulfsohn v. Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic, involving valu-
able furs confiscated and sent to New York, the lower State Courts, fol-
lowing the implications of earlier doctrine, allowed an attachment, holding
that the immunity of state property was a matter of comity. The Court
of Appeals ultimately reversed this position, holding that a de facto govern-
ment, even though not recognized, was immune from suit; that this im-
munity did not rest in comity, but upon fundamental considerations of
international relations.
Yet the English courts have indicated in like cases that they would
allow recovery of such property. In one case, in fact, a recovery was al-
lowed in the Court of the King's Bench of which the Court of Appeals
spoke approvingly, but which that Court set aside only because meantime
recognition had been granted to the Soviet government by Great Britain.
And such recognition, in practice, has the effect of legitimizing, or at least
placing beyond judicial inquiry, all prior acts of the recognized govern-
ment, under a doctrine of retroactivity. All remedies thereafter must be
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sought through the political rather than through the judicial department.
The rigidity of the doctrines of the law with respect both to recognized
and unrecognized governments is such as frequently to do violence to justice
and to public policy. Mr. Hervey makes a number of thoughtful sugges-
tions to ameliorate these conditions. He would allow suit in certain cases
of unrecognized governments in the name of the state rather than in the
name of the government; and he would introduce some form of public con-
servation for the properties of states having unrecognized governments,
pending the advent of a recognized government. He feels that courts of
non-recognizant states should admit the fact where a de facto government
is functioning, and give effect to its acts and decrees, in so far as they af-
fect individual rights, where equity and public policy require it. Such
views, while not sustained by precedents, are nevertheless sustained by
reason and analogy, he declares.
Mr. Hervey has not only made an interesting contribution toward the
elucidation of a complex legal subject, but it is worthy of mention that he
has placed text-writers in his debt for the introduction of a new adjective
in our legal terminology in "recognizant" and its negative, "non-recog-
nizant," in place of the rather awkward verbal adjective "recognizing" and
"non-recognizing," heretofore employed to describe states extending or
withholding recognition.
STELrNG E. EDMUNDS.
St. Louis, Missouri.
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